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In this paper, we analyse competition among jurisdictions to attract foreign capital through low taxes and
public inputs that enhance rmsproductivity. The competing jurisdictions are di¤erent in size and mobility of
capital is costly. We nd that for moderate mobility costs, small economies can attract foreign capital by supplying
higher levels of public goods than larger jurisdictions, without practising tax undercutting. The classical result
that small jurisdictions are attractive because they engage in tax dumping is recovered only for high mobility
costs of capital.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we analyze competition among
countries to attract entrepreneurs through low
taxes on capital and/or high level of public goods,
which enhance rm productivity. Our main in-
terest is in investigating which types of countries
(small or large) are attractive to foreign entre-
preneurs and which instruments (taxes or public
goods) are chosen by the successful jurisdiction.
The phenomenon of tax competition among
countries to attract mobile capital, entrepreneurs
or shoppers has generated a large body of lit-
erature. Two topics have attracted particular
attention. One focus, the normative approach
to tax competition, has considered the ine¢ cien-
cies created by mobility (see for instance Zodrow
and Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1995, Mintz and
Tulkens, 1986, Wildasin, 1988ab, Bucovetsky,
1991, Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991, Matsutmoto
1998, Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau, 1998).
A second topic of interest has been the study of
the characteristics2 that a country should possess
to be a desirable destination for investors and
foreign consumers (Wilson, 1991, Kanbur and
Keen, 1993, Barros and Cabral, 2000, Bjorvatn
Corresponding author skerdilajda.zanaj@uni.lu
2For example, the level of employment, population den-
sity, production technology, tari¤s and subsidies.
and Eckel, 2005, Hauer and Wooton, 1999). In
this paper, we adopt a similarly positive approach
rather than a normative one by focusing on the
role of countries size asymmetries in attracting
mobile investors.
A nding that generally appears in the tax
competition literature is that small jurisdictions
benet from low taxes. The argument is that
small countries face more elastic tax bases than
larger countries if tax rates are uniform (Wil-
son, 1991, Kanbur and Keen, 1993, Hindriks and
Myles, 2006). This feature may also arise from
the homogeneity of the population in small coun-
tries. Wealthy individuals migrate to small ju-
risdictions in which they are able to democrati-
cally choose low taxes for themselves (Hansen and
Kessler, 2001).
It is important to note that if small coun-
tries were always to o¤er lower capital tax rates
than larger ones, then they would be importers
of capital and exhibit a high capital-labor ratio.
Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2010) use data
from 1991 to 1999 to show that this is not the
case, claiming that
"the correlation between the size-
population of a country and its tax
rate is not clear. For example, some
large countries like France and Ger-
many have below average tax rates.
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(...) [T]he predictions of the asym-
metric tax competition literature do
not appear to be realized in the real
world equilibrium."
Furthermore, recent data (Devereux et al, 2008,
Chen and Mintz, 2008) on e¤ective corporate
taxes show that some small countries, such as Bel-
gium or the Netherlands, set very low tax rates,
even lower than those of small countries such as
Luxembourg. Some medium-sized countries such
as Austria set rates that are as high as those in
some large countries. Large countries are also di-
vided in clusters on this basis: one requiring the
payment of high taxes (Argentina, China, Rus-
sia, US, France) and another o¤ering low taxes
(Ukraine, Poland). Therefore, the evidence is
that there is no monotonic increasing relationship
between capital tax rates and the population size
of jurisdictions.
The model developed in this paper allows for a
non-monotonic pattern of capital tax rates based
on the assumption that countries of unequal size
compete for foreign entrepreneurs using taxes and
public goods as incentives that improve rm pro-
ductivity. The existing literature has already ana-
lyzed the role of public goods di¤erentiation in re-
laxing scal competition (Zissimos and Wooders,
2008 and Hindriks et al, 2008). Accordingly, tax
rate di¤erentials between competing jurisdictions
may persist in equilibrium. In the same vein, the
stratication of countries in di¤erent tax classes
can be explained by the quality di¤erentiation of
public goods (Justman, van Ypersele and Thisse,
2001). Bénassy-Quéré et al, 2007 also study joint
competition through taxes and the provision of
public goods that enhance consumersutility and
rmsproductivity. They nd in particular that
both the amount of public R&D expenditures as
a share of GDP and the road infrastructure had a
positive impact on FDIs owing from the United
States to European countries in 1994-2003.
We consider two jurisdictions of uneven size,
where size refers to the population in a given ju-
risdiction3 . Public goods that cover a wide range
3Country size may be dened by its population, by its
area, or by its national income (Streeten, 1993).We focus
on the population aspect rather than on spatial size. We
of infrastructures, services and regulations, pro-
vided by the local and/or the central government,
are attractive to rms if they enhance their pro-
ductivity4 . Consequently, entrepreneurs decide
where to locate capital according to di¤erences
in the level of public goods o¤ered and tax dif-
ferentials, net of the mobility cost. Competition
between jurisdictions follows a two-stage game.
First, governments decide on the level of pub-
lic goods to supply, and then they set tax rates
to maximize their rents. This timing leads to a
strategic e¤ect of public good provision on tax
competition intensity because jurisdictions can
anticipate during the rst stage how harsh tax
competition will be in the second stage.
The main ndings of the paper can be summa-
rized as follows. A large jurisdiction can only be
attractive to capital through the supply of higher
levels of public goods than its smaller rival o¤ers.
Such a result emerges if the mobility cost of cap-
ital is very low. Importantly, a small jurisdiction
does not need to lower taxes to be attractive to
foreign investments. For a certain range of mobil-
ity costs, it attracts foreign capital by supplying
a higher level of public goods than its larger ri-
val does without levying lower taxes. We show
that for this equilibrium to occur, the cost level
of mobility has to be intermediate and small coun-
tries must demonstrate no other specic feature
apart from their size. However, adopting a low
thus assume that spatial area does not present a physi-
cal limitation for newly established rms. We also focus
on competition between jurisdictions that di¤er greatly in
size. Accordingly, we assume that when the population
size is very small, the investment in human capital and
the number of entrepreneurs are most likely very limited.
4In this context, we may consider transportation in-
frastructures, universities and public R&D investment in
addition to property rights enforcement, capital market
regulations, labor and environmental regulations and the
absence of red tape procedures. It follows that countries
ability to attract foreign investment may also be based on
the quality of their institutions. In the Oxford Handbook
of Entrepreneurship (2007), it is argued that the number
of entrepreneurs in a country depends, among other fac-
tors, on the character of regulations, property rights, ac-
counting standards and disclosure requirements. Further-
more, in recent years there has been a surge of country and
cross-country studies relating economic development to in-
stitutions, especially those a¤ecting capital market devel-
opment and functionality (La Porta et al.,1997, among
others).
3tax regime is a winning strategy for a small coun-
try if the mobility cost of capital is high enough.
A new general conclusion can be drawn based
on the this model: all other things being equal,
a certain degree of size asymmetry between ju-
risdictions is su¢ cient to dene the direction of
capital movements.
Findings relevant to our paper can be found in
Hindriks et al (2008) and Zissimoss and Wood-
ers (2008). Zissimos and Wooders (2008) address
the ine¢ ciency issues that may arise when juris-
dictions compete regarding both taxes and public
investments. They show that competition in pub-
lic goods makes competition in taxes less erce
but has negative consequences for e¢ ciency. We
show that this impact on the intensity of tax com-
petition may not always exist because it depends
on the size asymmetry of the competing jurisdic-
tions and the mobility cost of capital. Hindriks et
al (2008) also develop a model of tax and public
goods competition with perfect capital mobility.
Their aim is to investigate equalization schemes
in federal states. They assume that jurisdictions
di¤er in their attractiveness when one possesses
a superior production technology. This asymme-
try can be altered by public investments. The
authors nd that a region can be attractive to
capital even if its capital taxes are higher than
those of its rival if its level of equilibrium invest-
ment is not e¢ cient, as in Zissimos and Wood-
ers (2008). In both papers, ine¢ ciency arises
because jurisdictions make investment decisions
at the rst stage of the game and then compete
in taxes. Hence, to make tax competition less
erce, jurisdictions invest ine¢ ciently in public
goods. Our approach shares with their paper the
idea that scal choice is ine¢ cient because of the
strategic e¤ect of public goods levels on tax com-
petition intensity. However, the purpose of our
paper is di¤erent.
Other contributions also deal with competition
for capital between asymmetric jurisdictions. For
example, Barros and Cabral (2000) consider a
subsidy game between asymmetric countries to
attract foreign direct investments to alleviate un-
employment. In equilibrium, the winner is the
country that gains the most in terms of employ-
ment for given transportation costs. Hauer and
Wooton (1999) also consider competition for for-
eign investments by stressing the role of inter-
national trade costs and the "home market" ef-
fect. Because the authors consider asymmetri-
cally sized home markets, the large country will
have an advantage in attracting foreign capital.
In both papers, a small economy can only be at-
tractive to foreign investments if it underbids the
larger one in terms of taxes or if it overbids it
in terms of subsidies. In our paper, however, we
show that the small country can win in interjuris-
dictional competition without being attractive in
term of taxes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents the model and denes the SPN
equilibria of the two-stage game. Section 3
presents the properties of such equilibria when
capital ows from the small to the large country.
Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium where capital
ows from the large country to the small one.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
Consider two jurisdictions h and f of uneven
size. The term jurisdiction refers equally to dif-
ferent regions of the same country or to di¤er-
ent countries provided that these entities have the
power to tax. Size refers to the magnitude of the
population, which coincides with the number of
capital-owners who are simultaneously entrepre-
neurs and workers. Entrepreneurs are endowed
with one unit of a capital good (one individual
one unit of capital one rm). They are hetero-
geneous according to their willingness to invest
abroad. Thus, we assume that capital-owners are
distributed over the interval [0; 1] ; with density
sh (resp. sf in country f), sh + sf = 1; in an
increasing order of their willingness to invest at
home5 . Assume without loss of generality that h
is the small jurisdiction, i.e. sh < 1=2.
The technology is dened as follows. Each en-
trepreneur is able to combine one unit of the cap-
ital good with her own labor to produce q + ai,
(i = h; f) units of a nal good, where q is the
5These exogenously given populations will not change be-
cause we consider entrepreneurs as commuters. What
changes is where the capital is invested.
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private component of (gross) productivity6 . The
fraction ai (i = h; f) of the produced good de-
pends on a public input -public good- supplied
by jurisdiction i = h; f 7 . One additional unit of
public goods produces one additional unit of pri-
vate good. It follows that ai also represents the
amount of public good supplied by jurisdiction
i = h; f . Providing rms located at i = h; f with
this public good is costly. The corresponding cost
function is given by C(ai) = a2i i = h; f .
An entrepreneur of type x; x 2 [0; 1] ; either
invests one unit of capital in her country i, or
invests in the foreign jurisdiction j. If she in-
vests in her home country, her prot is given by
i = q + ai   ti, where ti denotes the tax in
country i levied on one unit of capital8 . If she
invests abroad (country j), her prot becomes
q+ aj   tj net of kx, which is the disutility of in-
vesting abroad given her type x. The coe¢ cient k
represents a unit cost of moving capital abroad.
When k ! +1; capital is immobile, and when
k ! 0; capital is perfectly mobile. This parame-
ter can also be interpreted as a measure of the
degree of international integration. We will see
that the value of k is critical in explaining how
each country adjusts its attractiveness based on
tax- and/or public-service-related considerations.
From now on we assume, without loss of gen-
6This output good is sold in a competitive (world) mar-
ket at a given price normalized to one. Assuming that
both countries have equal access to a common market im-
plies that the smaller jurisdiction does not su¤er from a
reduced home market. We further suppose that the unit
production cost is constant and equal to zero without loss
of generality.
7This public input may represent material and immate-
rial public infrastructures. ai satises the requirements
necessary for it to be called a local public good, which
means that it is jointly used without rivalry by rms lo-
cated in the same jurisdiction. It follows that the benets
and costs of these goods only accrue at the jurisdictional
level. As in Zissimoss and Wooders (2008), we do not
consider congestion costs. Taking into account congestion
would complicate our framework without improving the
qualitative character of the results. Moreover, if ai repre-
sents immaterial public goods such as law and regulations
(protecting intellectual property, specifying accurate dis-
pute resolution rules, etc), the absence of congestion is
easily justied by the particular nature of these goods.
8For the sake of simplicity, we assume that q is such that
the prot of each rm is positive for all equilibrium levels
of public goods and taxes.
erality, that investments ow from jurisdiction i;
i = h; f to j = h; f . The capital-owner of type xi
is indi¤erent between investing abroad and stay-
ing at home if
q + ai   ti = q + aj   tj   kxi; (1)
which yields
xi(ai; aj ; ti; tj) =
(aj   ai) + (ti   tj)
k
: (2)
In other words, country j attracts capital from
jurisdiction i if the net gain of investing in j i.e.
aj   tj ; is higher than the net gain obtained by
staying in jurisdiction i, ai ti; net of the mobility
cost.
Jurisdictions are assumed to maximize their
tax revenue net of public investment cost. The
payo¤ function of the capital exporting jurisdic-
tion i; i = h; f is
Bi(ai; aj ; ti; tj) = si(1  xi)ti   a2i : (3)
For the capital importing jurisdiction j, j = h; f
Bj(ai; aj ; ti; tj) = [(1  si) + sixi] tj   a2j (4)
Governments play a two-stage game. First, they
decide on the quantity of public goods to pro-
vide. Then, they select the level of tax rates. The
choice of sequentiality follows from the rule that
the most irreversible decision must be made rst.
The game is solved through backward induction.
Denition Given the fundamentals of the
model (k; si); i = h; f , the SPNE of the
game is dened as (ai (k; si); a

j (k; si); t

i (k; si);
tj (k; si);x

i (k; si)) for i; j = h; f; i 6= j:
3. Capital ows from h to f
Consider the case in which capital ows from
the small country h to the large one f . Hence,
the small country is in this section the capital
exporter, si = sh.
3.1. The tax game
Each jurisdiction maximizes its budget with re-
spect to its own tax rate, assuming that its rivals
5tax is given and the level of public services is xed
in the rst stage
Max
th
Bh(th; th) (5)
Max
tf
Bf (th; tf ) (6)
The objective functions are strictly concave in ti
and tj (@2Bi(j)=@t2i(j) =  2si(j)=k < 0) and the
rst order conditions yield the following best re-
ply functions
th(tf ) =
tf
2
+
(ah   af )
2
+
k
2
; (7)
tf (th) =
tf
2
+
(af   ah)
2
+
1  sh
sh
k
2
: (8)
Clearly, taxes are strategic complements, and
best reply functions have slopes smaller than one.
Accordingly, there exists a unique equilibrium in
tax rates given by
eth(ah; af ) = (ah   af )
3
+
1
3
1 + sh
sh
k; (9a)
etf (ah; af ) = (af   ah)
3
+
1
3
2  sh
sh
k (9b)
Note the negative strategic e¤ect of public good
provision by country f on the tax rate of coun-
try h, and vice versa. Each jurisdiction has
an incentive to dampen its own investment in
public goods to lower the incentive of the rival
jurisdiction to engage in tax-cutting behavior.
This is similar to what we see in Hindriks et
al (2008) and Zissimos and Wooders (2008),
who show that at equilibrium, public goods
will be supplied ine¢ ciently. Substituting tax
values (9a) and (9b) in (3) and (4) we obtain
the payo¤ functions Bh(ah; af ) and Bf (ah; af ):
3.2. Competition in public goods
At the rst stage, each jurisdiction maximizes
its budget with respect to its own public good
provision
Max
ah
Bh(ah; af ) (10)
Max
af
Bf (ah; af ) (11)
From the rst order conditions, the resulting best
replies are
ah(af ) =   sh
9k   sh af +
k (1 + sh)
9k   sh ; (12)
af (ah) =   sh
9k   sh ah +
k(2  sh)
9k   sh : (13)
In the following, we assume that k > sh=9 to
guaranty the concavity of the objective functions
in ah and af . The equilibrium for public services
is then
ah =
3k(1 + sh)  sh
3 (9k   2sh) (14)
af =
3k(2  sh)  sh
3 (9k   2sh) (15)
Introducing the equilibrium public services into
equations (9a) and (9b) yields equilibrium tax
rates
th =
3k
sh
ah; (16)
tf =
3k
sh
af : (17)
Given the concavity condition k > sh=9,
the above equilibrium values are positive if
sh=9 < k < sh=3(2   sh) or k > sh=3(1 + sh).
For these parameter values, the equilibrium of the
game is unique because the best replies, in each
stage of the game, satisfy the uniqueness condi-
tions9 . If sh=3(2   sh) < k < sh=3(1 + sh),
the small country neither supplies any public
good nor taxes its residents, i.e. ah = 0 and
th = 0: In this set, the best reply of the large
country becomes af = k(2   sh)= (9k   sh) and
tf = 3ka

f=sh:
We substitute the equilibrium values of tax
rates and public goods in (2) to obtain the ow
of capital moving from h to f
xh =
(1  2sh) (sh   3k)
sh (9k   2sh) ; (18)
where 0 < xh < 1 if sh=3(1 + sh) < k < sh=3:
9Notice that perfect mobility k = 0 does not meet the
concavity conditions related to the choice of public goods
provision. If capital is immobile, k ! +1; equation (2) is
not dened. These boundary cases therefore need special
treatment as presented in Appendix A.
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The equilibrium public budget Bh and B

f ob-
tain as
Bh =
(9k   sh) (3k   sh + 3ksh)2
9sh (2sh   9k)2
(19)
Bf =
(9k   sh) (sh   6k + 3ksh)2
9sh (2sh   9k)2
(20)
These levels are positive due to the concavity of
the objective functions. It follows that equilib-
rium taxes generate su¢ cient revenues to fund
the equilibrium public goods.
Given the equilibrium of the game
(ah(k; sh); a

f (k; sh); t

h(k; sh); t

f (k; sh);x

h(k; sh)),
we can then state the following lemma
Lemma 1 The capital exporter is the small
country h, xh > 0; if
10k 2

sh
3(2 sh) ;
sh
3

:
Using Lemma (1), we can now identify the in-
strument used by the large country to attract cap-
ital:
Proposition 1 If a large jurisdiction imports
foreign capital, xh > 0; it is only because it is
attractive in terms of public goods.
Proof. Due to Lemma 1, capital ows from
h to f if k 2

sh
3(2 sh) ;
sh
3

. This interval is
equal to

sh
3(2 sh) ;
sh
3(1+sh)

[

sh
3(1+sh)
; sh3

. If
k 2

sh
3(1+sh)
; sh3

; we have k > sh3(1+sh) >
2sh
9
and it follows from equations (14), (15), (16) and
(17) that th < t

f and a

f > a

h: Moreover, for
k 2

sh
3(2 sh) ;
sh
3(1+sh)

; ah = 0 and t

h = 0 and
the best replies af =
k(2 sh)
9k sh and t

f =
3k
sh
af of
the large country carry a positive sign. It follows
that af > a

h and t

h < t

f .
10For completeness, notice that for k 2 ( sh
3
; 1
3
) and
k 2 ( sh
9
; sh
3(2 sh) ); the equilibrium values are such that
ah   th > af   tf . Thus, given the advantage presented
by the small country ah   th, there exists no type of in-
vestors that would be willing to move from country h to
country f: In this area, the equilibrium of the game is given
by the interior equilibrium with xh = 0 (see the left-hand
side of Figure 1).
We conclude that for k 2 (sh=3(2  sh); sh=3),
the small country adopts a low tax regime at equi-
librium. This result is reminiscent of that of Keen
and Kanbur (1993), but with the proviso that the
small country is not successful in attracting for-
eign capital even if it engages in tax undercut-
ting. This tax behavior of the small country is
due to the elasticity rule explained in Kanbur and
Keen (1993). But the reason why the small coun-
try does not succeed in attracting foreign capital
is that the large countrys relative attractiveness
in terms of public goods outweighs its small ri-
vals tax attractiveness. The mechanism underly-
ing Proposition 1 is that capital mobility is high
enough to compel the small country to undercut
its tax rate to such an extent that it can only af-
ford a low level of public spending compared to
that of its rival.
This behavior can explain why large countries
persist in setting high tax rates that may be es-
sential to supply high levels of public goods to
attract foreign capital.
4. Capital ows from f to h
We now turn our attention to the case wherein
the exporting country is the big country si = sf ,
thus the small is attractive to capital. We solve
the same game as above, and the equilibrium
emerges as
af =
3k (2  sh)  (1  sh)
3 (9k   2(1  sh)) (21)
ah =
3k (1 + sh)  (1  sh)
3 (9k   2(1  sh)) (22)
Using the equilibrium public services, equilibrium
tax rates are established as
tf =
3k
1  sh a

f ; (23)
th =
3k
1  sh a

h: (24)
The above equilibrium values are positive if
(1  sh) =9 < k < (1  sh) =3(2   sh) or
k > (1  sh) =3(1 + sh). The large country nei-
ther supplies a public good nor levies taxes
if (1  sh) =3(1 + sh) > k > (1  sh) =3(2  
sh). The best replies of the small country
7become ah = k(1 + sh)= (9k   2 (1  sh)) and
th = k (9ksh   sh + 1) =2 (1  sh) (9k + sh   1),
which both carry a positive sign given the con-
ditions on the values of k. Also note that, as
in the previous section, we can show that the
public budgets are positively signed at equilib-
rium. In equilibrium, we obtain af   ah =
(1  2sh) k= (2sh + 9k   2). Then, it can easily
be veried that af   ah > 0 and tf   th > 0 if
k > 2(1  sh)=9. Let us set k = 2(1  sh)=9.
Proposition 2 The smaller jurisdiction adopts
a low tax regime if the cost of capital mobility
exceeds the trigger value k. However, if capital
mobility is high enough, k < k, the smaller juris-
diction o¤ers more public goods than its rival and
taxes more.
It follows that the classical result according
to which small countries always undercut taxes
hinges on the condition that capital mobility cost
has to exceed a trigger value k, which decreases
with the degree of size asymmetry between the
competing jurisdictions. Given this result, we
now investigate whether the small country can
attract foreign entrepreneurs without tax under-
cutting. To put it di¤erently, can we have xf > 0
if k < k?
Substituting the equilibrium tax rates and pub-
lic goods levels in (2), the capital ow xf from f
to h; is
xf =
(1  2sh) (3k + sh   1)
(1  sh) (9k + 2sh   2) ; (25)
where 0 < xf < 1 if k > (1  sh) =3 or
k < (1  sh) =3 (2  sh). We can then state the
following lemma
Lemma 2 The capital exporter is a large coun-
try, i.e. xf > 0; if
11
k 2

1  sh
9
;
1  sh
3(1 + sh)

[

1  sh
3
;
1
3

11As in footnote (9), notice that for k 2 ( 1 sh
3(1+sh)
; 1 sh
3
);
the equilibrium values are such that af   tf > ah   th.
Thus, xf = 0:
Note that the sets of admissible k dened in
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 may overlap. If their
intersection is not empty, we cannot univocally
determine which country, the large or the small
one, is the destination for capital ows12 . The
source of this indeterminacy resides in the size
asymmetry of the competing jurisdictions. In-
deed, it is easy to verify that this intersection
is empty if 0  sh < 1=4. It follows that, all
other things being equal, the size di¤erence be-
tween jurisdictions denes the direction of cap-
ital ows. From now on, we assume that sh
will be small enough to eliminate this indetermi-
nacy. Accordingly, the intervals given in Lemma
1 and in Lemma 2 are ordered in the following
way: in the interval (sh=3(2  sh); sh=3) ; mo-
bility costs will be said to be low. In the in-
terval ((1  sh) =9; (1  sh) =3(1 + sh)), mobility
costs will be considered moderate and high in
((1  sh) =3; 1=3).
Given the equilibrium of the game, we can then
state the following (see the right-hand side of Fig-
ure 1) proposition
Proposition 3 A small jurisdiction is attractive
to foreign capital
(i) in terms of public goods notwithstanding its
high taxes if the level of mobility cost is moderate;
and
(ii) in terms of taxes, notwithstanding its low
supply of public goods, if the level of mobility cost
is high.
Proof. Consider the sets in Lemma
2. (i) When k 2

1 sh
9 ;
1 sh
3(2 sh)

[
12The overlapping of sets does not lead to two-way ows.
In fact, the types of entrepreneurs in one jurisdiction di¤er
based on their willingness to move abroad, but the set of
types is the same across jurisdictions. Therefore, given the
equilibrium quantities of public goods and taxes for each
jurisdiction, there is only a one-way migration ow. In
other words, if xisi entrepreneurs decide to invest in j; it is
not possible, that for the same parameters (si; k); there are
entrepreneurs quitting j: Indeed for each value k belonging
to this intersection, we obtain two competing equilibria.
One for (sh; k) and one for (1   sh; k). More exactly, we
have a unique equilibrium for (sh; k) and another unique
equilibrium corresponding to (1   sh; k):In the rst case,
the big country is the destination for capital, while in the
second case capital ows to the small country.
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
1 sh
3(2 sh) ;
1 sh
3(1+sh)

; we get th > t

f and a

h > a

f :
In particular, for k 2

1 sh
9 ;
1 sh
3(2 sh)

; th > t

f
and ah > a

f because k <
sh
3(1+sh)
< 2sh9 . For
k 2

1 sh
3(2 sh) ;
1 sh
3(1+sh)

; we obtain af = 0 and
tf = 0 and the best replies of the large country
are ah > 0 and t

h > 0; as we showed above. It
follows that ah > a

f and t

h > t

f . (ii) When
k 2   1 sh3 ; 13, th < tf and ah < af because
k > sh3(1+sh) >
2sh
9 :
Proposition 3(i) newly indicates that small ju-
risdictions can be attractive to foreign capital
without adopting low-tax regimes. To explore
the reason for this result, we begin to show the
mechanism at work when capital mobility is rst
high and then low. Then we argue that the case
highlighted in Proposition 3(i) appears to be an
intermediate case.
Recall that when capital is highly mobile, tax
competition is tough and the small country un-
dercuts the large countrys tax rate to such an
extent that it can only a¤ord a low amount of
public goods. As a result, the large countrys
relative attractiveness in terms of public goods
outweighs its small rivals tax attractiveness.
When capital mobility is low, tax competition
is relaxed and tax rates increase because capi-
tal becomes more captive. This tax increase will
however be more important in the large country
where the tax base is the largest. Capital will par-
tially ow to the small jurisdiction but this loss
will be overcompensated for a tax increase levied
on the capital owners who do not leave. As a
result, the small country becomes tax attractive
and has no incentive to supply a higher level of
public goods.
When the mobility cost is moderate, capi-
tal mobility is not high enough to induce erce
tax competition as explained above and not low
enough to induce the large country to increase
tax rates as in the scenario of low capital mobil-
ity. This range of mobility costs may therefore
entice the small country to make itself attractive
in terms of public goods, which are made a¤ord-
able when it taxes capital returns at a higher rate
than the big country.
This intermediate case can be reproduced using
the rule of capital supply elasticity with respect
to tax rates. Consistently to this rule, the small
jurisdiction supplies the highest level of public
goods (ah   af > 0) and that large country f
sets the highest tax rate (th   tf > 0) if the mo-
bility cost k is not too high, k < ek. We pro-
ceed as in Kanbur and Keen (1993) when two
public "instruments" are used. It follows that
ah   af > (1  2sh) =2 (1  sh) k and equal tax
rates th = tf = t lead to a higher tax elasticity
for the capital supply faced by the large country
(jf j > jhj)13 . In other words, if the di¤eren-
tial in public goods supplied by jurisdiction h is
high enough, the small country is able to alter the
capital elasticity it faces to such an extent that
it does not need to adopt a low tax regime. The
large jurisdiction will undercut its small rivals
tax rate (th   tf > 0).
In summary, (i) a jurisdiction that sets a higher
tax rate than its rival can be attractive to foreign
rms, and (ii) small jurisdictions can be high- or
low-tax regimes according to the degree of inter-
national integration.
For the sake of clarity, we present in Figure 1
the sets of parameters (k; si) that generate di¤er-
ent patterns of capital movements.
The left-hand side shows the parameter con-
stellations (k; sh) for which capital ows out of
the small country h, xh > 0; or does not ow
out, xh = 0. The right-hand side of Figure 1
shows the parameter values (k; sf ) for which cap-
ital ows out of the large country f; xf > 0; or
does not ow out, xf = 0. The white areas rep-
resent the set of parameters for which there is no
capital outow xi = 0. The light-grey shaded
areas represent the sets in Lemmas (1) and (2).
The dark-grey-shaded area corresponds to the pa-
rameter values that do not verify the concavity
conditions. Corner solutions are then possible,
but the model is not able to univocally predict
the sign of xi:
13The tax bases of the large and the small countries
are respectively dened by Sf = sf
 
1  xf

and Sh =
(1  sh)
 
1 + xf

: If tax rates are equal across jurisdic-
tions (th = tf = t), we can easily obtain capital supply
elasticities.
94.1. Public goods and tax competition
Finally, we ask if greater international di¤eren-
tiation in public goods will reduce the intensity
in (capital) tax competition. Derivating the dif-
ferentials a = a

i   aj and t = ti   tj with
respect to k shows that there is no monotonic
relationship14 between a and 

t : When k 2
((1  sh) =3; 1=3); we obtain @a=@k < 0; while
@t =@k can be positive or negative. Thus, in the
considered interval for k, greater mobility leads
jurisdictions to di¤er in terms of public goods,
but tax di¤erentials may not move in the same
direction because a higher k can cause a reduc-
tion in t : Indeed, when the mobility cost falls
within the range ((1  sh) =3; 1=3), the large ju-
risdiction may need to increase its level of public
goods and decrease its taxes relative to those of
its smaller rival to contain the outow of entre-
preneurs. This strategic move leads to a higher
a and a smaller 

t . For all other admissible
sets of k; higher capital mobility (lower k) entices
jurisdictions to di¤erentiate (higher a) and tax
competition is less intense (higher t ).
Proposition 4 There exists a range of k values
such that an increase in capital mobility increases
tax competition even if jurisdictions di¤erentiate
in public goods.
14The derivates are given in Appendix B.
5. Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship be-
tween country size (population) and attractive-
ness to international capital. Attractiveness is
built through low taxes on capital or public goods
or services that improve rm productivity. Entre-
preneurs face di¤erent costs of mobility according
to their willingness to locate their capital in a for-
eign country. We show that when the mobility
cost is low or moderate, a jurisdiction can only
be attractive through the supply of higher lev-
els of public goods and not through lower taxes.
However, adopting a low tax regime may only be
a winning strategy if the mobility cost is high
enough. Another important conclusion is that
small jurisdictions may attract international capi-
tal by supplying a high level of public goods with-
out being tax havens. We demonstrate that, for
this equilibrium to occur, the cost level of mo-
bility must be intermediate and no other specic
feature is necessary for the small country apart
from its size.
This paper can be extended along di¤erent
lines. One extension would be to develop a dy-
namic model of repeated games to capture a pos-
sible learning e¤ect of governments concerning
the self-selection of entrepreneurs. It would also
be interesting to introduce labor or di¤erent types
of capital to control for di¤erent degrees of mo-
bility to ascertain the e¤ects of preferential tax-
ation: namely, to switch the burden of taxes to
less mobile factors.
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Appendices
Appendix A
To study the extreme cases of capital mobility
(no capital mobility and perfect mobility) spe-
cic treatments are necessary. More precisely, if
k < si=9, the concavity condition is not fullled,
and if k > 1=3, we obtain xi > 1, which is not
allowed (0  xi  1).
No Capital immobility: k ! +1
Capital is not able to move and we have xi = 0.
There is thus no interjurisdictional competition to
attract capital and equilibrium taxes and public
goods can be deduced as follows. Because (do-
mestic) capital supply is inelastic, tax maximiz-
ing governments will extract the maximum rent
from the domestic rms ti = t

f = q. Because the
production of public goods is unnecessary (for at-
tracting foreign capital) and costly, governments
decide to set ai = a

j = 0.
Perfect capital mobility: k = 0
Although this case has evident theoretical rel-
evance, it does not include an important ingre-
dient of our model, which is the heterogeneity of
investors. With perfect mobility, we have two ho-
mogeneous groups of investors who are only dif-
ferent in terms of their initial locations.
With perfect capital mobility, countries set
the value of public goods o¤ered in the rst
stage and then enter a tax game à la Bertrand.
We solve the model via backward induction.
Countries h and f maximize Shth and Sf tf
respectively, where Sh and Sf are the capital
supply functions for the respective countries.
Because we are in a Bertrand tax game, the
capital supply functions are written as follows
Sh =
8<: sh + sf = 1 if ah   th > af   tfsh if ah   th = af   tf
0 if ah   th < af   tf
Sf =
8<: sh + sf = 1 if af   tf > ah   thsf if af   tf = ah   th
0 if af   tf < ah   th
This game leads to tax undercutting down to
the level where ah   th = af   tf ;which leads
to the absence of capital movement (xi = 0
for i; i = h; f ). Now, we turn to the pub-
lic goods game and consider the above condi-
tion of no movement. We therefore maximize
Bh(ah) = sh (ah   af + tf )   a2h with respect to
ah and Bf (af ) = (1 sh) (af   ah + th) a2f with
respect to af . Solving the FOCs leads to the equi-
librium values ah = sh=2 and a

f = sf=2. It fol-
lows that tf   th = af  ah = (1 2sh)=2 > 0. In
other words, the small country undercuts in taxes,
tf > t

h, and the large country counteracts in of-
fering an excess level of public goods, af > a

h. It
results paradoxically that capital does not move
in the equilibrium even though there is perfect
capital movement because the small countrys
tax attractiveness and the large countrys pub-
lic goods attractiveness neutralize each other.
Appendix B
Here we study the sign of the derivatives of
a = a

i   aj = k 2si 19k 2si and t = ti   tj =
k 3k(2si 1)si(9k 2si) with respect to k.
1. In the intervals k 2

si
3(2 si) ;
si
3

and
k 2

si
9 ;
si
3(1+si)

, derivating wrt to k gives @

a
@k =
2 (2si 1)si
(9k 2si)2 < 0 and
@t
@k =
3(9k 4si)(1 2si)k
(2si 9k)2 sh : The
sign of the last derivative depends on the sign of
9k   4si. When 9k   4si > 0, we get @

t
@k > 0.
This implies k > 49si, which is inconsistent with
k 2

si
3(2 si) ;
si
3

and k 2

si
9 ;
si
3(1+si)

. So,
@t
@k < 0: Hence, when the big or the small juris-
diction is attractive because of the high level of
public goods they provide, there is comovement
in tax and public goods attractiveness when cap-
ital mobility increases.
2. Consider now k 2   si3 ;1. If a > 0
and t > 0, remember that entrepreneurs em-
igrate from jurisdiction f to avoid high taxes.
Derivating the tax and public goods di¤eren-
tials gives @

a
@k =
2sf (1 2sf )
(9k 2sf )2 < 0 and
@t
@k =
11
3 ksf
2sf 1
(9k 2sf )2 (9k   4sf ). It may be shown that
for k 2

1 sh
3 ;
4(1 sh)
9

, @

a
@k and
@t
@k are iden-
tically signed. However, for k 2   49 (1  sh);1,
we have @

a
@k < 0 and
@t
@k > 0. In this case, there
is no more comovement in tax and public goods
attractiveness when capital mobility increases.
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